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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the demand for,
and supply of, nuclear qualified submarine officers in the
ranks LTJG to CDR during the 19 80's and beyond. Four demand
and six supply scenarios are developed and compared to give
24 possible patterns of projected officer shortages and
surpluses over the years 1982 to 1997, and in steady state.
The relative effectiveness of various accession and lateral
entry policies is then examined in an attempt to identify an
optimum accession and/or lateral entry program. Finally, the
Navy's ability to meet the required accession goals is assessed
by studying the projected supply of college graduates quali-
fied to enter the nuclear submarine force.
The pattern of shortages and surpluses projected indicates
that unless attrition rates can be reduced, it will not be
possible to fully man the submarine force with nuclear
qualified officers before 1993 without a policy of lateral
entry, for example, nuclear engineers working in industry.
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On March 4, 19 81, the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable
Casper W. Weinberger, presented a defense plan to Congress
that sought an increase in strength across almost the entire
spectrum of American military power. An important segment
of that plan was a program aimed at rapidly expanding the
Navy from 455 ships to 600 in order to restore "unquestioned
American naval supremacy" [Ref. 1: p. 24].
On October 7, 19 81, speaking before the Dallas Council
of the Navy League of the United States, the Secretary said:
The requirements of maritime power as dictated by
our need to maintain vital access to NATO, to Southwest
Asia and to our Pacific allies, require at minimum a
600 ship Navy based on 15 carrier battle groups.
[Ref. 2: p. 41]
With that statement the Secretary was simply reiterating
what has been the policy of President Reagan's administration
ever since the March 4 presentation to Congress; and today
that commitment appears to be as firm as ever.
Although the final composition of this 600 ship Navy is
still not clear, an increase in the size of the nuclear sub-
marine force is planned. The current five year ship build-
ing plan includes the construction of 17 new nuclear attacJc
submarines (SSN) by 19 87, and the continued construction of




Unfortunately, in the past there has been a chronic
shortage of nuclear qualified si±>marine officers to man even
the existing fleet. On March 31, 19 76, Admiral Hyman G.
Rickover, USN, then Director of the Division of Naval Reac-
tors, Energy Research and Development Administration, and
Deputy Commander for Nuclear Propulsion, Naval Sea Systems
Command, testified before the Department of Defense Sub-
committee of the House of Representatives Committee on Appro-
priations that the inventory of nuclear qualified officers
was only 71% of the requirement [Ref. 4: p. 17]. Shortages
in the number of nuclear qualified officers
,
particularly sub-
marine, continue today and any increase in the size of the
submarine force can only exacerbate the problem. When the
importance of the nuclear submarine force to the strategic
deterrent of the United States is considered, solving the
manpower problem becomes critical to the success of the
President's overall defense policy.
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is threefold:
1. to examine the demand for, and supply of, nuclear
qualified submarine officers in the ranks Lieutenant,
Junior Grade (LTJG) to Commander (CDR) during the
19 80 's and beyond,
2. to examine the relative effectiveness of alternative




3. to assess the Navy's ability to meet these required
accession levels during the 19 80 's.
Ensigns have been excluded from the analysis because of the
lack of suitably disaggregated data. At the time of the
analysis the author was not able to separate nuclear qualified
Ensigns from those not qualified. Accordingly "accessions"
should be interpreted as flows into the rank of LTJG. No
analysis has been conducted on ranks above CDR since, with
the exception of two Captains for each SSBN, 726 (Trident)
,
all sea billets are filled by a CDR or below.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout the analysis, a number of assumptions have
been maintained:
1. A nuclear qualified officer is defined as an officer
who is a graduate of Nuclear Power School.
2. The Navy will expand to 15 battle groups and
approximately 600 ships by 1990.
3. All new submarines will be nuclear powered.
4. The same types of boats requiring the same officer
manning as those currently in the fleet will be built
during the 19 80 's.
In addition to these general assumptions, a number of specific
assumptions have been made at various points throughout the





The methodology employed follows six basic steps. In
Chapter II, the expected number of sea billets to be filled
each year is estimated by multiplying the manning requirement
for each class of submarine, as promulgated in the current
ship manning docximent (SMD) [Refs. 5-llJ , by the number of
that class of boat expected to be in the fleet in that year.
The summation of all classes then gives the total demand for
sea billets for each year under consideration. To emphasize
that this requirement for sea billets represents the number
of officers required to man the submarines of the fleet, it
has been entitled, "boat manning demand."
Having established the sea-billet requirement, the number
of shore billets necessary to permit a specified sea/shore
rotation for each rank is estimated by multiplying the number
of sea billets by the required rotation ratio. Once again,
to emphasize that this shore-billet requirement represents
the number of officers not on sea duty at any particular time
who must be available to allow a specified rotation ratio,
it has been entitled, "rotation demand." The summation of
these two requirements is the total number of officers (billets
necessary to man the fleet and provide the specified rotation
ratio for each year considered.
It should be noted that the number of shore billets is
completely dependent on the number of sea billets required,
and the specified rotation ratio. No attempt has been made
to estimate the number of shore billets actually necessary in
14

the nuclear-submarine force. The number of officers required
for rotation purposes, i.e., rotation demand, may be greater
than, less than, or equal to, the number actually required
to fill necessary positions ashore.
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter II, four possi-
ble total demand scenarios are then developed by making
different assumptions on which positions are filled by
nuclear-qualified officers and the desired rotation ratio.
The same projected fleet inventory is used throughout the
analysis
.
In Chapter III, a computer model known as MANMOD , which
is available at the Naval Postgraduate School, is used to
project the number of nuclear-qualified officers expected to
be available during the 1980 's and beyond. Starting with the
current stock of nuclear qualified officers, three different
attrition-rate vectors and two promotion-rate vectors are
utilized to generate six possible supply scenarios. In
Chapter III, accessions into the rank of LTJG are kept con-
stant at 40 per annum, the average number achieved over the
past 3 years. In Chapter V the effect of different acces-
sion rates is explored.
In Chapter IV the projected annual supply of officers
of each rank is simply subtracted from the corresponding
demand projection and the resulting surpluses, or shortages,
are presented in matrix form. The areas of deficiency are
examined in some detail for the period 19 82-1990. The author's
concern here is with the immediate problem of manning
15

the increased number of boats through the decade of the '80's.
In Chapter V the period 19 8 2 through 199 7 is examined with a
view to establishing an optimum accession policy for the
long term.
Finally, in Chapter VI, an attempt is made to assess
how difficult it is going to be for the nuclear submarine
force to recruit suitably qualified young men in the numbers
indicated by the analysis of Chapter V. Unfortunately, no
detailed studies have been conducted on what factors signifi-
cantly affect the level of officer accessions, as has been
the case with enlisted recruitment. It was not possible,
therefore, to conduct any type of regression analysis in order
to predict the supply of officer accessions. This study has
thus been restricted to a somewhat subjective assessment of
the future recruiting environment. During the 19 80 's, is it
going to be easier, or harder, to meet accession goals than
it has been in the past? Firstly, the sources of supply of
potential officers and the qualifications required are des-
cribed and the historical record of the Navy's officer ac-
cession program is examined. Trends in the nuclear submarine
force's requirement for accessions are then compared with
projected trends in the supply of suitably qualified college






In this chapter, four demand scenarios are developed on
the basis of a projected fleet mix, two assumed manning re-
quirements for nuclear-qualified officers and two assumed
sea/shore rotation ratios. The development of each scenario
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
A. PROJECTED FLEET MIX
Because it forms the start point for all subsequent calcu-
lations, the assumed composition of the fleet, both as it
grows through the decade and in its final form as part of a
600 ship Navy, is central to any conclusion that may be drawn
from the following analysis. Unfortunately, this mix is also
difficult to predict because it is subject to political deci-
sion, and it is subject to the uncertainty of construction
times, technological developments, and changes in the perceived
threat.
Nevertheless, some assumed fleet mix is essential, and the
mix that has been chosen to form the basis for the analysis
that follows is the projection developed in the Naval Post-
graduate School 600 Ship Study conducted during the first
one-half of 1981 (Table 1) . This projection was developed
by naval officers studying at NPS in 19 81 after close consul-
tation with sources in Washington, D.C. The projection con-
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The current ship building plan revealed by the Administra-
tion in September 19 81 proposes to build 17 new nuclear-
attack submarines by 19 87, for a total of 33 against a
predicted, in March 1981, total of 34, plus continued produc-
tion of 1 SSBN Trident submarine per year [Ref. 3: p. 7].
This last proposal is also reflected in Table 1. Over the
same period it is anticipated that a number of the older
types of submarines, notably SSN 575, 578 and 59 8, will be
decommissioned as their reactor lives expire.
B. FOUR DEMAND SCENARIOS
1 . Boat Manning Demand
To develop two levels of boat manning demand, it was
first assumed that all positions were to be filled by nuclear
qualified officers. This is not presently the case, but the
author has been led to believe that this is the ultimate goal;
so the assumption has been included to establish an upper
bound on the number of sea billets that must be filled by
nuclear-qualified officers. This level of demand is repre-
sented by box (2) in Fig. 1 and is called "High Manning."
To establish a lower bound on manning demand, it
was assumed that selected positions need not be filled by
nuclear-qualified officers. This level of demand is repre-
sented by box (3) in Fig. 1 and is called "Low Manning."
The officer manning requirements of each class of
submarine represented in the fleet, as promulgated in the
applicable SMD, are given in Table 2. Each SSBN has two

TABLE 2







SSN SSN SSBN*# SSBN#






*Does not include 2 x Captain for each boat.




crews known as the BLUE crew and the GOLD crew. Cruises are
of three months duration with each crew alternating three
months at sea, three months ashore. However, for the pur-
poses of this study both crews are considered to be perform-
ing sea duty, and the manning requirement for this type of
submarine, as given in the SMD ' s , has been doubled in Table
2. As discussed previously two Captains for each Trident,
and Ensigns are excluded from the analysis. Also excluded are
supply officers, designator 3100. Classes with identical
manpower requirements have been grouped for ease of computation,
During computational work, the projected fleet mix was simi-
larly grouped, but it has been presented by individual class
so as to show more clearly the expected changes in the fleet
mix over time. Table 2 reflects the assumption that all
positions are to be filled by nuclear qualified officers and
therefore represents "high manning."
The positions assumed not to require a nuclear-
qualified incumbent are listed in Table 3. It is stressed
that these positions do not reflect any official policy. They
have been selected by the author on the basis of various
conversations with nuclear-qualified submarine officers at
the Naval Postgraduate School and in Washington, D.C. After
these positions are deleted, the manning requirement for
nuclear-qualified officers is as listed in Table 4. Table
4 therefore represents "low manning."
Applying each manning level to the projected fleet




MANNING REQUIREMENTS: "LOW" POSITIONS DELETED
POSITION TITLE RANK
SHIP NAV GEN LCDR
SHIP NAV (INSTR) LCDR




TACTICAL SYSTEMS OFR. LT
COMM AF LT





MANNING REQUIREI-IENTS : NUCLEAR QUALIFIED OFFICERS
"LOW MANNING"
SSN SSN SSN SSBN*# SSBN#
SHIP TYPE 575 671 578 726 616
597 688,637 598,608 627







*Does not include 2 x Captain for each boat.




represent the number of nuclear-qualified officers required
to man the submarines of the fleet for each year under con-
sideration under each manning assumption. Table 5 is the
expected demand for nuclear-qualified officers if all posi-
tions are filled by qualified officers while Table 6 is the
expected demand for nuclear-qualified officers if it is
assumed that selected positions only need be filled by
qualified officers.
2 . Rotation Demand
To calculate the various levels of rotation demand,
two separate sea/shore ratios have been defined; both are
shown in Table 7. The first, called "low ratio" applies a
1 for 1 ratio between shore and sea duty time for all officers
,
except LTJG ' s , who spend all of their service in that rank on
sea duty. This ratio has been extracted from a study by
Teply in which he analyzed the sea tour opportunities of
submarine officers [Ref . 12] . In his study, Teply used the
number of years of service normally necessary to obtain a sea-
tour position to form a matrix of normal sea-tour positions.
For the purposes of this study, the same years of service have
been utilized and substituted as a proxy for rank. This
assumption is considered reasonable, because within the sub-
marine community the rank required for a tour is commensur-
ate with the normal advancement of officers who are promoted
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SEA/SHORE ROTATION RATIOS (YEARS)
RANK
LOW RATIO (1) HIGH RATIO (2)





(1) Teply, J.F., (1980)
(2) URL Career Guidebook, (1979)
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The second ratio, called "high ratio" has been de-
rived from the general tour- length policy as promulgated in
the Commanding Officer's Addendum to the URL Career Guidebook
published by the Military Personnel and Training Division in
March, 1979 [Ref . 13] . Because the high ratio results in
officers spending a greater proportion of their time on sea
duty, it results in a smaller additional requirement for
officers than does the low ratio.
Although neither ratio conforms exactly with the sea-
tour lengths actually being achieved, they are considered to
be close enough to form two quite reasonable options when
considering what sea/shore rotation ratio is both desirable
and achievable. For example, in the November/December 1981
issue of Perspective, a newsletter for Navy officers, it was
reported that actual sea-tour lengths achieved by submarine
officers relieved during 19 81 were 3.8 years for Commanding
Officers, i.e., CDR's, and 3.1 years for Executive Officers,
i.e., LCDR's. Department Head tours, which are filled by
both LT's and LCDR's, averaged 3.1 years also [Ref. 14].
Applying each of the two rotation ratios to each of
the two levels of boat manning demand results in four levels
of what has been termed "rotation demand," which represents
the number of nuclear-qualified officers that must be filling
shore-duty positions each year to allow the desired sea/shore
rotation times for all officers. Table 8 is thus the number
of officers required to meet rotation demands when the low
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by the high manning assumption. This is the highest of the
four levels of rotation demand and is represented by box (4)
in Fig. 1. Similarly, Table 9 represents the combination of
the high rotation ratio with the high boat manning demand.
Since the higher rotation ratio requires that a smaller num-
ber of officers be available for rotation purposes, it is
smaller than the first combination and is represented by
box (5) in Fig. 1. Continuing, Table 10 represents the com-
bination of the low rotation ratio with the low boat manning
demand and is represented by box (6) in Fig. 1. Finally,
Table 11 gives the lowest level of rotation demand, i.e.,
the combination of the high rotation ratio with the low boat
manning demand, and is represented by box (7) in Fig. 1.
3. Total Projected Demand
Adding each of the above rotation demand levels to
its corresponding boat manning demand, results in four pro-
jected levels of total demand. With reference, once again,
to Fig. 1, total demand A represents the sum of boat manning
demand under the high manning assumption and rotation demand
under the high manning/low ratio assumption. This is the
highest level of demand developed in the analysis. Similarly,
total demand B is the sum of the high boat manning demand and
rotation demand under the high manning/high ratio assumption.
Total demand C is the sum of the low boat manning demand and
rotation demand under the low manning/low ratio assumption.
Total demand D, the lowest level, is the sum of the low boat
31
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manning demand and rotation demand under the low manning/
high ratio assumption.
All four levels of total demand are summarized in
Table 12. Over the period 1981-1990, the increase in the
total officer requirement ranges from approximately 22%








RANK PROTECTION 1982 1934 1986 1988 1990
CDR A 302 322 330 348 362
B 264 282 289 304 317
C 302 322 330 348 362
D 264 282 289 304 317
LCDR A 758 804 814 856 892
B 632 670 678 713 743
C 600 632 644 672 692
D 500 527 537 560 577
LT A 760 830 868 932 982
B 633 692 723 777 818
C 306 334 346 372 394
D 255 278 288 310 328
LTJG A 595 632 646 678 702
B 595 632 646 678 702
C 302 322 330 348 362




Following the establishment of a number of demand scenarios,
the next step is to develop some supply scenarios to match
against these projected demand levels. To accomplish this,
a computer model known as MANMOD, which is available at the
Naval Postgraduate School, was used. Several supply projec-
tions were developed by varying the inputs into the model.
To develop a single projection, four data inputs are required:
the initial stock of officers, planned accessions, and any
two of either the historical attrition rates, continuation rates,
or promotion ratas . Each of these rates is expressed as a
fraction between zero and one inclusive, and all three must
sum to one. Consequently, if two are know, the third may
be calculated. In practice, the model uses only the continua-
tion and promotion rates.
The projections in this study are based on a time increment
of one year, although the results have been presented in incre-
ments of two years to avoid implying a higher level of preci-
sion than is in fact the case. Seasonal, quarterly, and
monthly inventory fluctuations are ignored by applying pro-
motion and continuation rates only once each period. The
implicit assumption here is that attrition and promotion
occur at a uniform rate through the year. Annual accessions
are applied once at the end of each year. When an officer
is promoted, his year group is not affected. For example.
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a LT with 9 years of commissioned service (YCS) who is promoted
during the period appears in the inventory for the next
period as a LCDR with 10 YCS. If he is not promoted he ap-
pears as LT with 10 YCS.
This brief explanation and some further assumptions that
must be appreciated to properly interpret the projections will
suffice here. It is not intended to discuss the technical
details of the model any further. The interested reader is
referred to an excellent text by Bartholomew and Forbes en-
titled "Statistical Techniques for Manpower Planning" [Ref.
15]. All of the data necessary to construct the transition
matrices used for the projections in this chapter are summarized
in Appendix A. An explanation of the derivation of each
input is given in the following sections.
A. DATA REQUIREMENTS
1. Initial Stocks
Firstly, the initial stock of officers, by rank and
by YCS, must be known. In the analysis that follows, the
initial stock of officers is defined as those nuclear quali-
fied officers in the ranks LTJG to CDR who were available
for duty as at Jan 30, 1982 (Table 13).
2. Promotion Rates
The promotion rate is defined as the percentage of
the total number of officers of a particular rank and YCS
cohort who are promoted during a given year. The promotion
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TOTAL 739 827 375 328
SOURCE: Submarine and Nuclear Officer Program




used for planning purposes by OP132. Throughout the analysis,
these rates will be referred to as "Promotion Rate-Plan."
The promotion plan specifies the promotion percentage
for each cohort by rank and by YCS (Table 14) . Promotion is
only to the next highest rank, and occurs after four YCS
for LTJG's, between eight and ten YCS for LT • s , between 14
and 16 YCS for LCDR's and between 21 and 22 YCS for CDR's.
TABLE 14
Promotion Plan





Below Zone Zone Above Zone
















Source: Officer Management Simulation Model
Officer Professional Development




However, except for LTJG's, where the promotion
percentage is 100% after attrition, these percentages do not
correspond directly to the promotion rate as defined above.
The total number of officers promoted depends on the number
actually in the promotion zone, i.e., 9 YCS for LT , 15 YCS
for LCDR, and 21 YCS for CDR's. When the promotion percentage
applicable to the zone is applied to the number of officers
in the zone, the result is the total number of officers who
may be promoted, including those who are promoted from below
the zone , for example a LT with 8 YCS, and those from above
the zone , for example a LT with 10 YCS . The actual promotion
rate of officers in the zone is therefore less than the per-
centage quoted in the promotion plan.
The above discussion is best illustrated by an example.
Suppose there are 83 LT ' s with 9 YCS, i.e., in the zone, 10 4
with 8 YCS and 12 with 10 YCS in some particular year. From
Table 14, the promotion percentage for LT's in the zone is 9 5%.
A total of 79 LT's will therefore be promoted [83 x .95 ~ 79].
However, four of these, [79 x .05] , will be selected from
below the zone and six, [79 x .083], will be selected from
above the zone. This leaves only 69, [79 - 10], to be selected
from within the zone. The promotion rates for each YCS are
therefore as follows
:
LT (8 YCS) = 4/104 = .0385
LT (9 YCS) = 69/83 = .8313
LT (10 YCS) = 6/12 = .50
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Clearly, given a constant promotion percentage the
actual promotion rate for each year group will vary depending
on the number of officers in the zone. For the purposes of
this study, promotion rates have been calculated using the
promotion percentages in Table 14 and the officer stocks shown
in Section 3, Table 15. These stocks were chosen rather than
the initial stocks because two years of data were available.
By calculating the promotion rate for each year and then taking
an unbiased average, a more stable and, hopefully, more relia-
ble estimate was obtained. Calculations using the initial
stocks of Table 13 resulted in promotion rates very close to
those used, within two decimal points in most cases.
Discussions with officers familiar with the manning
problems of the submarine force indicated, a priori , that the
major shortages would probably occur at the LCDR level. Con-
sequently, a second supply iteration utilizing a higher and
more rapid promotion rate from LT to LCDR, was included in
the analysis. This doubled the number of supply projections
from three to six. Because it is not possible to signifi-
cantly increase the promotion rate while the number of offi-
cers in the zone is used as a cap on the total number that
may be promoted, this restriction was temporarily laid aside.
Instead, in this second iteration, a constant percentage of
each year group was promoted each year. The percentages,
chosen quite arbitrarily, are as follows,
LT (8 YCS) ... 1%
LT (9 YCS) ... 95%





NUCLEAR QUALIFIED SUBMARINE OFFICERS
OCT 1, 1980 AND OCT 1, 1981
RANK
LTJG LT LCDR CDR CAPT







9 83 91 2 1
10 6 18 82 59




15 34 43 11 14
16 7 2 54 39




21 39 5 7 6
22 41 3 13 16








SOURCE: Officer Management Simulation Model
Officer Professional Development




These rates in fact represent a maximum for LT ' s with 9
YCS. If the attrition rateof LT's with 9 YCS is 5% or greater,
then 100% of those who continue will be promoted. Only if
their rate of attrition falls below 5% will any officer
continue as a LT with 10 YCS
.
When making projections, both the planning and re-
vised promotion rates remain fixed, regardless of the attrition
rate vector being applied (see Section 3 below) . Instead,
the continuation rate is allowed to vary to maintain the
equality with one discussed in Section 1, i.e., the sum of
attrition rate plus continuation rate plus promotion rate
must equal 1.0.
3 . Attrition Rates
Thirdly, it is necessary to know the rate of attri-
tion, or wastage, out of the nuclear submarine officer force.
This rate is usually calculated from historical data after
allowing for any atypical periods. It should also be ex-
pressed by rank and by years of commissioned service. Aver-
age rates may be used, but less accurate projections must be
expected. Having calculated an historical rate, the assump-
tion of the model is that this same rate will apply in future
years
.
In the analysis described below, three attrition
rate vectors—high, medium and low—were applied to the
initial stock of officers. Obviously, there is only one
correct rate and the use of three vectors illustrates the
difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent data. All
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three were calculated from data made available by different
Navy sources. In all three calculations it was assumed that:
a. all LCDR's who are not promoted will attrite
by the end of 22 YCS , and
b. all CDR's who are not promoted will attrite
by the end of 2 4 YCS , and,
c. all LT's who are not promoted will attrite by the
end of 11 YCS.
Other assumptions were also necessary when calculating
individual vectors, but these will be discussed separately
in the appropriate sections.
a. High Attrition
The attrition rate designated as "High" was calcu-
lated using the flows implied by data on the stock of nuclear
qualified officers as of '1 Oct 1980 and 1 Oct 1981 (Table 15)
and the planned promotion rates discussed in Section 2.
Because of some inconsistencies in these data, a number of
additional assumptions were necessary. If it is assumed that
both of the LCDR's with 9 YCS in 1980 continued in the force
in 1981, it follows that, since there were 59 LCR's with 10
YCS in 1981, 57 must have been promoted from the stock of
LT's with 9 YCS as of 1 Oct 1980. This leaves 26 LT's with
9 YCS to continue as LT's in 1981 (83-57 = 26). However,
since the actual number continuing was 18, eight must have
attrited. The attrition rate of LT's with 9 YCS as of 1 Oct
19 80 is therefore 8/83 = .0 9 64. Given a planned promotion
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rate of .8276 (Appendix A), their continuation rate is
therefore 1 - .0964 - .8276 = .076.
Secondly, to calculate the attrition rate of
LCDR's with 10 YCS it is assumed that all those attriting
come from that group and not from the group of LT's with 10
YCS being promoted to LCDR. Therefore, since three officers
are expected to be promoted from LT (.5417 x 6 :: 3) and the
stock of LCDR's with 10 YCS has declined from 82 to 80, then
their rate of attrition becomes 5/82 = .061. Their continua-
tion rate is then .939 (1 - .061 - 0) .
Thirdly, it is assumed that LCDR's who have been
passed over for promotion experience zero attrition during
their 17th, 18th and 19th YCS. This is unlikely to be com-
pletely true in reality, but, given the small number of offi-
cers involved and their high propensity to continue in order
to secure a pension after 20 years of service, any distortion
of future stocks is expected to be negligible.
Finally, it is assumed that 100% of CDR's with
15 YCS will continue, as they have received early promotion.
Based on these special assumptions , together with
the common ones presented earlier, a transition matrix
showing the continuation rate, promotion rate and the attri-
tion rate (high) , for each rank by YCS may be constructed
from Table 15. This matrix will be referred to as Matrix A
(High Attrition) . In each projection the promotion rate being




The second attrition vector, called "Medium
Attrition," was calculated from the average nuclear submarine
officer cumulative continuation rates over the past five
years as shown in Table 16. Since only one continuation rate
is given for each YCS , there may be some bias in these figures.
Officers of equal rank but different lengths of service are
unlikely to experience the same rate of attrition. For exam-
ple, a LT with 11 YCS who has been passed over for promotion
is more likely to leave the service then a LCDR with 11 YCS
whose career is progressing as expected. Consequently, an
attrition rate expressed only in terms of years of commissioned
service is likely to overestimate the attrition rate of LCDR's
with 11 YCS and underestimate the rate for LT ' s with 11 YCS.
However, once again, the number of officers involved is small
and this simplification should not create any significant
bias in the results.
The transition matrix constructed using this medium
attrition vector will be referred to as "Matrix B (Medium
Attrition)." In each projection the promotion rate being
applied will be stated explicitly.
c. Low Attrition
The third attrition vector, called "Low Attrition"
was taken directly from the planning rates used by OP132
in the Officer Management Simulation Model (see Appendix A)
.




CUMULATIVE CONTINUATION AND ANNUAL ATTRITION RATE
FIVE YEAR HISTORICAL AVERAGE

















* See assumption ref CDR's and LCDR's past over for
promotion.
SOURCE: Submarine and Nuclear Officer Program




transition matrix constructed will be referred to "Matrix C
(Low Attrition)." Once again, the promotion rate being used
will be stated explicitly for each projection.
4 . Accession Rates
Generally the term "accessions" refers to the num-
ber of officers entering the nuclear submarine force train-
ing pipeline, but for the purposes of this study, "accessions"
is defined as the flow of nuclear qualified submarine officers
into the rank of LTJG , which is the starting point of the
analysis.
In this chapter, and Chapter IV, accessions are kept
constant at 400 per annum and lateral entry is not considered.
During 19 79, 19 80 and 19 81, accessions into the training
pipeline were 443, 444 and 498, respectively. Historically,
however, entrants suffer an average 12% attrition during
training and approximately 1.4% of Ensigns attrite. The num-
ber that may be expected to reach the rank of LTJG from each
of the above year groups is therefore 384, 385 and 432,
respectively, or an average of 400 per annum. Assuming a
constant flow of 400 per annum into the rank of LTJG pre-
sumes constant accessions into the training pipeline of approxi-
mately 461 per annum.
B. SIX SUPPLY SCENARIOS
Combining three attrition rate vectors with two promotion
rates results in six transition matrices and therefore six
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The data required to construct each transition matrix are
summarized in Appendix A.
1. CDR/LCDR
As expected, the high attrition rate results in a
significantly smaller inventory of CDR's and LCDR's by 1990.
The revised promotion rates increase the supply of both CDR's
and LCDR's under all attrition rates. The impact on the supply
of LCDR's is felt immediately, and by 1990 the increase in
expected supply ranges from 11.8% under the high attrition
vector to 8% under medium attrition. Because of a lag, as the
increased supply of LCDR's gains service time in that rank,
the impact of the increased rate of promotion from LT to
LCDR is not felt at the CDR level until 1988. By 1990, the
expected supply of CDR's has increased by between seven and
two percent, depending upon the rate of attrition. This
difference can be expected to increase beyond 1990 as an
increasing number of LCDR's move into the CDR ranks and total
supply approaches steady state.
2. LT/LTJG
With LT's and LTJG's, the impact of different attrition
and promotion vectors is less clear-cut. The attrition vector
that has been termed "medium attrition" results in a lower
expected supply than the so-called high attrition vector for
both ranks. In the case of LT's, lower attrition results in
a significantly greater expected supply by 1990, but a much
smaller difference in expected supply for LTJG's; a maximum
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of 33 out of a total of between 767 and 800. Obviously the
increased rate of promotion from LT to LCDR does not affect
the expected supply of LTJG's, but it does result in a small
reduction in the expected supply of LT's, ranging from 17
to a maximum of 38. The difference between the most opti-
mistic supply scenario, i.e., low attrition and the planned
promotion rates, and the most pessimistic, i.e., medium
attrition and revised promotion rates; is 414 for LT ' s , but




IV. SUPPLY VS DEMAND
A. PROJECTED SUPPLY/DEMAND IMBALANCES
By applying six supply projections against four demand
projections, 24 quite different forecasts of future supply/
demand imbalances are obtained. This provides something of a
smorgasbord of results , but one must remember the assumptions
upon which each projection is based. It is not the intention
of this thesis to identify one outcome as "the" future manning
situation. No attempt is made to arrive at a single "correct"
prediction. Instead, the reader is asked to critically assess
the assumptions underlying each projection, and, exercising
his own judgment, to accept that projection which, in his
opinion, is likely to be the most accurate. All possible
outcomes have been summarized in Tables 18, 19, 20 and 21.
1. CDR
Because all CDR positions require a nuclear qualified
officer, the level of demand for CDR's is not affected by the
high/low manning assumption discussed in Chapter II. It
varies only with the assumed sea/shore rotation ratio. Conse-
quently, demand levels A and C, both low sea/shore rotation
ratios, are the same while demand levels B and D, both high
rotation ratios, are also equal. To avoid unnecessary detail
these equal levels have been grouped in Table 18.
By 1990 the projected imbalance in the supply of CDR's
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ratio, high attrition and the planned promotion rate, to a
surplus of 72 officers under a high rotation ratio, low
attrition and the revised promotion rate.
Applying the high rotation ratio has a greater impact
than does changing the promotion rate. By 1990 the high
rotation ratio reduces the shortfall by 45 officers under
all attrition vectors, against between 7 and 11 if only the
promotion rate is changed. In addition, the impact of the
high rotation ratio is felt immediately. Increasing the
promotion rate from LT to LCDR does not affect the supply
of CDR's until 19 88. By far the most influential factor is
the attrition vector accepted. Accepting the low attrition
vector rather than the high converts a large shortage, 20 8
in 1990, into a surplus of 16 under otherwise identical condi-
tions. In the short term at least (19 82 through 1990) , it
appears that reducing the rate of attrition and accepting a
high sea/ shore rotation ratio will be necessary to combat
shortages in the CDR ranks.
2. LCDR
By far the greatest shortages are projected to occur
at the LCDR level (Table 19) . Only under the optimistic low
attrition vector do any surpluses appear and, once again, the
attrition vector accepted is the dominant factor. Under the
highest level of demand, high manning/low ratio, accepting the
low attrition vector over the high converts a projected
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otherwise identical conditions. If the other demand reducing
assumptions are also accepted, i.e., low manning/high ratio,
then the shortage is converted into an equally large projected
surplus of 411 officers. In every scenario, the low attri-
tion vector converts an initial shortage in 19 82 into a pro-
jected surplus by 1990. Under demand level A, high manning/
low ratio, the low attrition vector is able to convert a
shortage of 328 officers in 19 82 into a projected surplus of
96 by 1990. Such a large change casts some doubt on the
accuracy of the low attrition vector and leads one to ques-
tion its validity as a planning device. It does, however,
graphically illustrate the potential benefits of reducing
attrition. By 1990 the difference in the projected shortage
under the high and medium attrition vectors is around 100
officers, and this seems realistic. In spite of increasing
demand throughout the decade, the shortage of LCDR's in fact
declines under both the medium and low attrition vectors.
The shortage increases under high attrition, but, except for
at the maximum demand level, demand A, this increase can be
reversed by adopting the revised promotion rate.
Maximizing the promotion rate from LT to LCDR results
in some increase in the supply of LCDR's. By 1990, this
increase ranges from 81 under the low attrition vector to 46
under conditions of medium attrition. Under the high attri-
tion vector, the gain is 55, but the shortages are still the
greatest in absolute terms. Also, they persist until 1990
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in all high attrition scenarios. Even if the medium attri-
tion vector is accepted, shortages persist in all scenarios
except against the lowest demand level, i.e., low manning/
high ratio. Under the low attrition vector, surpluses are
projected in all scenarios regardless of which promotion rate
policy is adopted. Once again, it appears that in the absence
of lateral entry, the only short-term solution to the LCDR
shortage is reduced attrition.
3. LT
Even with accessions held constant at historical
levels, there is no shortage in the supply of LT's until 19 88.
Even then, the projected shortfall is very small and occurs
only under conditions of maximum demand (Table 20)
.
Again, the attrition vector accepted has a signifi-
cant impact on projected supply-demand imbalances. The low
attrition vector results in very optimistic supply projec-
tions even in the highest demand scenario. Accepting the low
attrition vector converts a maximum projected shortage of 86
under medium attrition to a surplus of 2 89 under otherwise
identical conditions. Most scenarios project an increasing
surplus of LT's until 19 86 followed by a decline through 1990.
By 1990, under high manning demand, both the high and medium
attrition vectors project a smaller surplus than in 19 82,
or even a shortfall, while the low attrition vector projects
an increase in supply under all demand conditions. Under the
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project an increased surplus by 1990, while the medium attri-
tion vector projects a small decline. Depending upon the
attrition vector accepted, increasing the promotion rate
decreases the supply of LT ' s by between 17 and 39 by 1990.
In contrast with the situation for CDR's and LCDR's,
the manning assumption accepted is a very important factor
in this case. This is because the majority of positions
deleted as not requiring a nuclear qualified incumbent are
LT positions (Table 3) . Accepting the low manning assumption
reduces the demand for nuclear qualified LT ' s by almost 600
officers in 1990, compared with a reduction of only 200 in
the demand for nuclear qualified LCDR's. At first, this
suggests that deleting the requirement that these positions be
filled by nuclear qualified officers may be an expedient way
of reducing demand. Unfortunately this would have an unde-
sirable long-term effect on the supply of nuclear qualified
LCDR's who are in short-supply even under the low manning
assumption.
4. LTJG
Because it is expected that a LTJG will spend all of
his time in that rank at sea, there is no rotation demand for
LTJG's (Table 7). The total demand for LTJG's will therefore
vary only according to the manning assumption accepted. As
a result, demand levels A and B, both high manning, are the
same, while demand levels C and D, both low manning, are also
equal. To avoid unnecessary detail these equal levels of
63

demand have been grouped in Table 21. Because changing the
promotion rate from LT to LCDR does not affect the supply
of LTJG's this column has also been delted from the table.
A surplus of LTJG's is projected under all attrition
vectors. In this case the attrition vector accepted does not
have a significant impact, while the manning assumption
accepted has a major impact, reducing demand by 340 officers
in 1990. For the same reasons discussed in Section 3, the
low manning level is not, however, an attractive policy option
Reducing the supply of nuclear qualified LTJG's will only
exacerbate the shortage of nuclear qualified LCDR's in later
years.
Because supply reaches steady state as early as 1984,
the projected surplus declines steadily through to 19 90 as
demand increases with the increasing size of the fleet.
Nevertheless, with a surplus projected in all scenarios con-
sidered, it does not appear that the supply of LTJG's will
be a problem during the 1980 's if historical accession rates
can be maintained.
B. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
From the data of Tables 20 and 21, it does not appear
that the supply of junior officers will be a major problem
during the 1980 's. As indicated a priori , the most serious
shortages are expected to occur at the LCDR rank and the
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In spite of the relatively healthy supply of junior
officers, the LCDR and CDR shortages are projected to persist
to 1990 and beyond unless the low attrition vector is accepted
as an accurate reflection of reality. However, given the
recent history of officer manpower shortages in the nuclear
submarine force, the very size of the surpluses generated by
this vector lead one to question whether it accurately reflects
historical attrition rates, or even what may reasonably be
expected to be achieved in the future.
Because the first shortages appear at the LCDR level in
all scenarios, increasing the number of accessions into the
Ensign rank is not the answer to the manning problems of
the 1980 's. Even if the size of the 1982 graduating class
could somehow be increased, these graduates would not reach
LCDR rank until at least 1990.
The surplus of LT ' s indicates that it may be possible to
reduce the sea/shore rotation ratio for these officers and,
perhaps, thereby reduce their attrition rate. This, in time,
would increase the supply of LCDR's allowing a reduction in
their sea/shore rotation ratio and so on until eventually an
improved supply of CDR's allows a reduction in their sea/shore
rotation ratio also. Whether such a policy would have a
significant impact, and how fast that impact would move upward
through the system, are questions for further research.
Alternatively, the supply of LCDR's could be increased
by increasing even further the percentage of LT ' s with 8 YCS
selected for early promotion, or even by allowing LT ' s to
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fill LCDR positions. However, promotions which are too rapid
will lower the general experience level of LT ' s . The impact
of increased promotion rates on the supply of LCDR's is
marginal at best and does not affect the supply of CDR's at
all until 1988.
Accepting the low manning assumption is not a viable long-
temi policy option because of the distribution of shortages
across different ranks. The low manning assumption has its
greatest impact at the LT level where there are no shortages
even under high demand conditions. The demand for nuclear
qualified LCDR's is reduced considerably under this assump-
tion, but shortages persist. Consequently, with low manning
demand levels it would still be necessary to train a surplus
of nuclear qualified junior officers to meet the demand for
nuclear qualified LCDR's in later years. Because there is
also a projected shortage of CDR's, who must be nuclear quali-
fied, it is not possible to reduce the supply of nuclear
qualified LCDR's without exacerbating this shortage. Quite
the reverse, because of the closed nature of the promotion
system the number of nuclear qualified LCDR's in the system
will have to be increased if the shortage of CDR's is to be
eliminated.
The projected shortage of nuclear qualified LCDR's, even
under the low manning assumption, indicates that, in the
absence of any lateral entry program, the continued use of




V. ALTERNATIVE ACCESSION POLICIES
In the analysis of Chapters III and IV, accessions were
kept constant at 400 per annum and only the period 1982-1990
was examined. In this chapter, this accession rate is varied
in order to explore the impact of increased accessions on
supply/demand imbalances, and the period 19 82-199 7 is examined
in an attempt to establish an optimum accession policy for the
long term. In Section A, policies involving accessions into
the rank of LTJG only are considered. In Section B, policies
including some lateral entry are examined. At this point the
reader is reminded that the term "accessions" is defined as
the flow of nuclear qualified submarine officers into the rank
of LTJG. To obtain an estimate of the number of Ensigns who
must enter the nuclear training pipeline, required accessions,
as calculated in this chapter, should be increased by approxi-
mately 15.5% to allow for attrition both during training and
during service as an Ensign.
The analysis that follows can be applied to any of the 24
supply/demand combinations developed in previous chapters,
but space limitations preclude this approach. Instead, the
author has chosen to accept his own advice and one scenario
is selected as the most probable. The scenario studied matches
demand level B (high manning/high ratio) against projected
supply under the medium attrition vector and revised rates of
promotion. A number of alternative accession policies are
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assessed on the basis of their capacity to redress the
shortages projected under this single sceanrio.
As discussed in Chapter IV, the low manning assumption
is not considered to be an attractive policy option on which
to base future manpower planning. The high manning assumption
has therefore been accepted. It is possible of course, that
some compromise between the high and low manning levels is
possible, but this requires study by a researcher more familiar
than the author with the requirements of each officer billet.
Ideally, a low sea/shore rotation ratio is desirable, but
after considering the demands that are likely to be made on
the nuclear submarine force during the 19 80 's, a pragmatic
approach is taken and the less desirable high rotation ratio
accepted as likely to be necessary for some time. In addition,
it is assumed that the size and composition of the fleet,
and therefore total demand, will remain constant from 1990.
On the supply side, the medium attrition vector is accepted
because it reflects actual historical data averaged over five
years. As such it is likely to be more accurate than the high
attrition vector which is based on a single flow between 1980
and 1981. As was also discussed in Chapter IV, the low attri-
tion vector results in such optimistic forecasts that its
accuracy is suspect. The revised promotion rate is also
accepted because the promotion rate is a policy variable that
may readily be changed by political decision. Given the
quality of officers traditionally entering the nuclear
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submarine force, a very high rate of promotion to LCDR rank
should be possible without any reduction in performance
standards
.
A. NO LATERAL ENTRY
In this section, three alternative accession rates, high,
medium and low, are considered. All are expressed at an





1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
HIC3i 400 400 450 500 550 600
Accession
MED 400 400 450 500 500 500
Rate
LOW 400 400 400 400 400 400
The low accession rate simply maintains total accessions
at the historical level of 400 per annum. The imbalances
projected, at least as far as 1990, are therefore the same
as those discussed in Chapter IV. The medium rate assumes
that the number of accessions can be increased by 50 per
annum to a maximum of 5 00 per annum and then held constant at
that level. The high rate assumes that the number of acces-
sions can be increased by 50 per annum to a maximum of 600
per annum and then held constant. The annual increase is
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held to 50 per annum because it is considered that this is
more realistic than assuming a sudden jump to the desired
level in only one year. Note also that the increases do not
begin until 19 84. The officers who will be entering the
LTJG rank during 19 82 and 19 83 have already been recruited
and no increase in this figure is possible. The aim here
is not only to explore the impact of increased accessions,
but to do so using hypothesized accession rates that repre-
sent feasible policy options. The supply/demand imbalances
projected under each accession rate are summarized in Table
23. The projected supply, by rank, under each accession rate
is also shown in Table 24. Total demand for the period
1982-1990 is the same as calculated in Chapter II (Table 12)
and is assumed to remain constant after 1990
.
1. CDR
The imbalance in the supply of CDR's is unaffected
by the accession rate before 1997. Increasing accessions
is therefore an ineffective way of attacking the shortage
of CDR's. By 199 3 a surplus in the supply of CDR's is pro-
jected regardless of the accession rate, and the surplus is
projected to increase as the system apporaches steady state.
In steady state the surplus ranges from a maximum of 2 59
under the high accession rate down to 6 7 under the low
accession rate.
2. LCDR
The imbalance in the supply of LCDR's is unaffected
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accessions is therefore an ineffective way of attacking the
shortage of LCDR's, at least during the 1980 's. After 1990
the alternative accession policies begin to have a differen-
tial effect. Under the high accession rate, a sizeable sur-
plus is projected by 199 5, and the system achieves steady
state with a surplus of 201 LCDR's. Under the medium accession
rate surpluses appear later and are not so large. The first
surplus projected is 33 in 1997, after which steady state is
achieved with a surplus of only 45 officers. If the current
low accession rate is maintained, then shortages may be ex-
pected to continue indefinitely. At an accession rate of
400 per annum, the shortage of LCDR's is projected to decline
to 113 by 199 7, but to remain around that figure even in
steady state. If the shortage of LCDR's is attacked by
varying the accession rate, then not only must the number of
accessions be increased, but a considerable time lag before
the shortage is eliminated, must be accepted.
3. LT and LTJG
The projected supply of both LT ' s and LTJG ' s increases
steadily under all accession rates until steady state is
achieved. However, because of increasing demand during the
19 80 's, the projected surplus increases at a slower rate, and
even declines under the low accession rate. Under both the
high and medium accession rates, the projected surplus of
LT ' s increases steadily from 1984 until steady state is
achieved. The surplus of LTJG ' s peaks in 19 8 8 under the high
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accession rate, and in 19 86 under the medium accession rate,
before declining slightly to its steady state level in 1990.
Although the projected supply/demand imbalances can not reach
steady state before 1990 when demand stabilizes, a surplus
is projected in steady state for both ranks. Under the low
accession rate, the projected surplus is not large, but under
both the medium and high accession rate, a large surplus is
projected for both LT ' s and LTJG ' s
.
B. LATERAL ENTRY POLICIES
In the final paragraph of Chapter IV, it was concluded
that the continued use of non-nuclear qualified LCDR's will
be necessary during the 1980 's unless some type of lateral
entry program is implemented. The analysis of Section A of
this chapter also suggests that unless accessions can be in-
creased above their present level of 400 per annum, such a
program of lateral entry will be required indefinitely. In
the analysis that follows, a number of possible lateral entry
policies are examined and their impact on the supply/demand
imbalance in the LCDR and CDR ranks over the period 19 82-
199 7 is assessed. Because no shortages appear below the rank
of LCDR regardless of the assumed conditions of supply and
demand, the policies considered have been restricted to
lateral entry at LCDR level only. In practice, more junior
officers could be recruited laterally, but this would delay
the impact of the program on the supply of LCDR's where the
need is most urgent. Entry at CDR level is not considered
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because lateral entry into a Commanding Officer's billet does
not seem to be a practical alternative unless of course
lateral entry from the Navy Reserve is accepted. Lateral
entry at the LCDR level will have an impact on the supply
of CDR's after a time lag. The length of this lag will
depend on the seniority of those LCDR's entering through the
lateral entry program. In the following analysis it has been
assumed that these LCDR's recruited laterally join the sub-
marine force during their 10th YCS . No impact on the supply
of CDR's can therefore be expected for at least six years,
regardless of the particular lateral entry policy implemented.
If either the medium or high accession rates can be
achieved, then a lateral entry program will be needed only to
combat the shortages projected for the period 1982-1993
(refer to Table 2 3) . Lateral entry can provide a short term
solution while the impact of the increased number of accessions
moves upward through the system finally eliminating shortages
even at the CDR level. Four possible lateral entry policies
of finite duration, designed to eliminate these shortages,
have therefore been incorporated into each of the three
accession policies discussed in Section A. These are policy
numbers I, II, III and IV in Table 25. If, however, accessions
remain at the low level of 400 per annum, a continuing
lateral entry program will be required to maintain a suffi-
cient supply of nuclear qualified LCDR's. With the aid of
the MANMOD model this question was addressed iteratively and




POSSIBLE LATERAL ENTRY POLICIES
ANNUAL ACCESSIONS
ENTRY TO LCDR ONLY
POLICY





— — — —
ENTRY III 50 50 50 50 — —
IV 100 50 50 50 50 —
POLICY V 100 50 50 30 30 30 • • •
VI 50 50 50 50 30 30 • • •
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maintain the required supply of LCDR's under a low accession
rate are included in the analysis. These are listed as
policy numbers V and VI in Table 25.
In all, there are 14 possible projections to be con-
sidered. Combining four short term lateral entry policies
with three accession rates results in 12 alternative projec-
tions. To these must be added the two continuous lateral
entry programs incorporated with the low accession rate,
giving a total of 14 projections. All 14 are summarized for
CDR in Table 26, and for LCDR in Table 27. The projected
supply under each combination of accession rate and lateral
entry program is also given for both CDR's and LCDR's in
Tables 2 8 and 29, respectively.
The systematic analysis of this many options may be
approached in two ways. The first approach emphasizes the
importance of the accession rate. It is suggested that the
reader first decide which accession rate appears to be the
most realistic in terms of achievability and cost. Once this
is decided, each lateral entry policy may be compared within
the framework of that accession rate and the optimal policy
selected. Alternatively, the most acceptable lateral entry
policy may be determined using whatever criteria are appro-
priate. The lowest accession rate that, in combination with
this lateral entry policy, provides the necessary supply may
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As expected, there is no impact on the supply of
CDR's before 1990 regardless of which combination of accession
rate and lateral entry policy is considered. However, from
1990 a surplus of CDR's is projected under all combinations.
From 1990 all combinations except one result in an increasing
supply, moving towards a peak in 199 5. The exception is the
combination of the low accession rate and lateral entry policy
number VI which peaks in 199 7. If the low accession rate is
maintained, supply is projected to decline after 1995, but a
surplus is maintained regardless of the lateral entry policy.
Policy numbers I to IV result in a projected steady state
surplus of 67. Policy numbers V and VI result in a higher
projected surplus of 166 because of the continuing nature
of these programs. Under both the medium and high accession
rates, supply dips after 199 7 but rises again to a steady
state surplus of 163 and 259, respectively. Since policies
I to IV are of finite length, the final steady state surplus
depends only on the accession rate and is therefore higher
the greater the number of accessions into LTJG.
2. LCDR
Because of the time lag between an individual's date
of entry in the rank of LTJG and his reaching the rank of
LCDR it is 1990 before the various accession rates begin to
have a differential impact.
Although the speed with which shortages are eliminated
depends on the size of the initial intake of officers, all
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lateral entry policies are projected to eliminate the shortage
of LCDR's by 1986 regardless of the accession rate. However,
from 1990 the situation is more complex and under most policy
combinations, shortages reappear during the 1990 's. Whether
these shortages persist depends upon the accession rate.
a. Low Accession Rate
Although lateral entry policies I, II, III and
IV are projected to eliminate the shortage of LCDR's by
19 86, these programs are of finite length and terminate well
before the end of the 1980 's. The initial increase in supply
simply moves through and out of the LCDR rank without being
replaced. As a result, shortages reappear by 1990 and con-
tinue to grow until the same steady state shortage of 112
officers, as projected in Section A, Table 23, is again achieved.
The shorter the duration of the lateral entry program the
earlier the shortages reappear and the more rapid the approach
to steady state. By contrast, because of their continuing
nature, lateral entry policy numbers V and VI not only achieve
surpluses by 19 86, but these surpluses are projected to continue
in steady state. If these policies were to be combined with
medium or high accession rates, the projected surpluses would
be higher but the general pattern of shortages followed by
surpluses would be the same.
b. Medium Accession Rate
If the medium accession rate is maintained, shortages
are projected to reappear under lateral entry policy numbers
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1, II and III. Once again the increased supply provided by
the lateral entry program has moved through and out of the
system before the impact of the increasing number of acces-
sions reaches the LCDR level. By 199 5 a surplus is again
projected as the increasing number of officers entering as
LTJG's reach LCDR rank. This surplus is projected to increase
to 46 in steady state.
On the other hand, lateral entry policy number
IV is of longer duration, and a surplus is projected for all
years from 19 86. By continuing the lateral entry program for
an additional year, the impact of increased accessions on
the supply of LCDR's is felt before the additional supply
generated by the lateral entry program leaves the system.
Under the medium accession rate, lateral entry policy number
IV is the only policy for which a continuous surplus is pro-
jected from 1986, although all four eventually achieve the
same steady state surplus. This occurs because all four pro-
grams are of a finite duration. In steady state, the only
determinant of supply is the accession rate,
c. High Accession Rate
The projections under the high accession rate are
the same as those under the medium accession rate until 1993
when the impact of the higher accession rate begins to be
felt. All shortages are eliminated by 1986 regardless of the
lateral entry policy implemented. Under policy numbers I,
II and III, for the same reasons discussed in Section 2.b,
shortages reappear in 1990 but are eliminated again by 1995.
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Because the effect of the higher accession rate is now being
felt on total supply, the projected shortages in 199 3 are
smaller than under the medium accession rate, and the surplus
is projected to be larger for every year from 199 5. As was
the case under the medium accession rate, and again for the
same reason, policy number IV is projected to achieve a sur-
plus for every year from 1986.
C. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
In the long term, beyond 1991, all shortages can be
eliminated simply by increasing the accession rate. Even if
the number of accessions remains at the current level of 400
per annum, long term shortages persist only at the LCDR level.
Nevertheless, as was indicated in the analysis of Chapter IV,
increasing the number of officers entering the rank of LTJG
will not, on its own, reduce the critical shortage of CDR's
and LCDR's between 19 82 and the early 1990 's. A possibly
undesirable side effect of increased accessions is an increas-
ingly large surplus of LT ' s and LTJG ' s . The very size of
these surpluses indicates that the officer manpower require-
ments of the nuclear submarine force, as dictated by the
current SMD ' s , do not conform with the classical pyramid struc-
ture. A relatively large number of LCDR's is required com-
pared with the demand for junior officers and even CDR's
(see Table 12) . As a result, any accession rate which is
sufficient to eliminate the shortage of LCDR',s also results
in significant surpluses in the supply of LT ' s and LTJG ' s
,
and, to a lesser extent, in the supply of CDR's. Whether
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the nuclear submarine force can absorb a surplus of up to
500 LT's and 450 LTJG ' s is beyond the ken of the author.
It is clear that if the shortage of LCDR's projected for
the 19 80 's is to be eliminated, some type of lateral entry
program is necessary. No lateral entry policy short of entry
directly at CDR rank, or very senior LCDR, can affect the
projected shortage of CDR's in the years 1986 to 1988. How
extensive any lateral entry program needs to be depends on
the accession rate. If the number of accessions remains at
400 per annum, then a continuing policy of recruiting at least
30 officers per year through a lateral entry program will be
required indefinitely. The figure of 30 per annum assumes
that up to 200 officers can be recruited in the first two
to three years of the program to rapidly eliminate the current
shortage of around 200. Approximately 30 per annum will be
required thereafter to prevent shortages from reappearing.
If the accession rate can be increased, such programs
need only be of limited duration. Even without a lateral
entry program, surpluses are projected by 199 5 under the
medium and high accession rates . Any lateral entry program
would only be required to cover the shortfall in supply until
the impact of the increased number of accessions into the rank
of LTJG reaches LCDR level. The analysis of this chapter indi-
cates that a lateral entry program would need to run until




Having established an optimum accession policy, or at
least a range of options, the next question is whether it
is going to be possible to recruit the required number of
officer candidates. As discussed in Chapter I, there have
been no studies so far as the author is aware on projected
officer supply during the 19 80 's. To date, officer manning
studies have assumed that the required number of officer
candidates will be available and that any supply constraints
will be in the size of the training pipeline or because of
budgetary restrictions.
These restrictions can of course be very real, but this
thesis addresses the more basic supply question. For the
years 1979 to 1981, accessions into the nuclear submarine
program averaged 461 per annum. In each year the force fell
short of its accession goals by 237, 211 and 156, respectively,
and the projected shortfall for 1982 is 193. It should be
remembered at this point that these figures represent the
number of new officer graduates entering the nuclear-siobmarine-
force training pipeline, not the number of entrants into the
force itself. Accessions into the rank of LTJG, the start
point for the analysis presented here, have averaged 400 per
annum over the same period, as discussed in Chapter III, Sec-
tion A. Given the accession goals that are necessary, it seems
that the real constraint on the supply of officer candidates

during the 19 80's may not be the size of the training pipe-
line, or even budgetary restrictions, but the Navy's inability
to attract sufficient candidates in the first instance un-
less there is an increase in the size of the available pool.
This is the question that will be addressed in this chapter.
A. HISTORICAL RECORD
In aggregate, the officer candidate supply picture appears
bright. In FY 1981, the Navy recruited 4860 candidates against
a goal of 4817, or 101%. Results such as these sometimes
lead officials to paint a glowing picture of the officer
supply situation. Testifying before the House Armed Services
Personnel Subcommittee on March 8, 1982, the Assistant Defense
Secretary Lawrence J. Korb said
...there is a surplus of would-be-officers, with 10
qualified applicants for each spot available in
the service academies, 6 for each Reserve Officer
Training Corps scholarship and 3 for each opening
in Officer Candidate Schools. [Monterey Peninsula
Herald, Tuesday, March 9, 1982]
However, the aggregated figure conceals a severe shortfall
in the nuclear-power programs. In fairness to Mr. Korb,
it must be pointed out that he did go on to say that " some
personnel shortages continue ... in nuclear trained officers."
(Author's emphasis.)
Table 30 shows the break-down of accessions against goals
for each officer candidate program. It can be seen that all
of the non-nuclear programs except the Civil Engineering




MAJOR OFFICER PROGRAM ATTAINMENT
FY 1981
PROGRAM GOAL ATTAINED PERCENT
Aviation Officer Candidate
Naval Flight Officer Candidate
Surface Warfare Officer
Supply Officer
General Unrestricted Line (1105) 325
Physicians
Nurses














SOURCE: Draft Navy Manpower/Personnel
Status Report, Unpublished
HASC Report, Oct 1981.
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The nuclear-power instructor program achieved 5 7% while the
Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate program (NUPOC) , which
primarily involves recruiting engineers , mathematics , and
physical science majors in their junior or senior year in
college, or upon graduation, for commissioning into the
nuclear submarine force achieved only 49% of its goal of 284.
This shortfall occurred in spite of the fact that approxi-
mately 23% of officer recruiter assets were dedicated solely
to the NUPOC program.
It is interesting to note that during FY 1981 only 54%
of the surface-warfare nuclear power officer recruiting goal
was attained. As a result, the NUPOC program has been expanded
to include recruitment of surface-warfare nuclear-power offi-
cers. Previously, all NUPOC accessions entered the submarine
force unless they became not physically qualified for submarine
duty after commissioning and entry into the program. This
development is not likely to assist recruitment into the sub-
marine force. On the contrary, it is likely to make it more
difficult since candidates who previously were prepared to
accept submarine duty now have the option of selecting surface
duty. Expansion of the program may well attract candidates
who previously would not accept suhnarine service, but it may
also attract to the surface fleet candidates prepared to accept
submarine service in the absence of any other option. Another
implication of the shortfall in surface-warfare-nuclear-power-
officer volunteers is that a policy of lateral entry of
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nuclear qualified officers from the surface fleet to the
submarine force is simply "robbing Peter to pay Paul" and
does not attack the overall shortage of nuclear qualified
officers.
B. SOURCES OF SUPPLY
1. Qualifications Required
In general, an officer candidate must be a U.S.
citizen, meet specified physical standards, and, except for
U.S. Naval Academy entrants who are recruited after graduating
from high school, either hold or be in pursuit of a bacca-
laureaute degree at an accredited institution. Nuclear power
candidates must have at least one year of college calculus
through differential and integral calculus and one year of
calculus-based physics with a "B" average or better. If the
degree held, or being pursued, is in a physics, mathematics,
or engineering curriculum major, the candidate must have a
"C" average or better in all technical science courses includ-




There are three major officer candidate programs lead-
ing to service in the nuclear submarine force. The United
States Naval Academy (USNA) intakes high school graduates who
then complete their baccalaureate degrees while at the
Academy. Academy graduates who meet the educational and physi-
cal qualifications described above may volunteer for service
in the nuclear submarine force. The other two programs are
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the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) and the
NUPOC program already discussed. Both programs recruit on
college campuses although graduates may apply for the NUPOC
program. Candidates accepted through the NUPOC program attend
the Navy Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island,
and are commissioned before going on to Nuclear Power School.
Entrants through the USNA and NROTC programs are commissioned
on graduation and go directly to Nuclear Power School. Since
19 77 total accessions from the three sources have averaged
around 66% of goals.
a. U.S. Naval Academy
Since 19 74 voluntary accessions from USNA have
averaged about 191 per annum while class sizes have averaged
around 913 per annum. Since future class sizes at the Academy
are expected to be restricted to less than 1000 for various
reasons, not the least of which are building restrictions, it
has been assumed that accessions from the Academy will con-
tinue at about the same level, i.e., approximately 200 per




If it is accepted that the number of accesssions
from the Academy is going to be fixed through the decade, then
clearly any increase in the number of accessions must come
through the NROTC and NUPOC programs, both of which recruit
out of the pool of college undergraduates, and recent gradu-
ates in the case of the NUPOC program. Consequently,
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projected changes in the size of this pool are of consider-
able interest when discussing future accession needs.
(1) The Target Population. It is not enough,
however, simply to consider changes in the number of college
graduates, because the requirements of the nuclear-submarine
force severely limit who may apply. First of all, applicants
must be U.S. citizens, and published data on college gradu-
ates include a large number of foreign students. Secondly,
only males are accepted, and they must be between the ages
of 19 and 29 years at the time of commissioning. In addition,
the vast majority of acoaptances are engineering, mathe-
matics or physical science majors. In 1980, 75% of acceptances
from the NROTC program, excluding non-volunteers, were engineers,
22% were math/physical science majors, and only 3% were non-
technical majors. In 1981, 70.5% were engineers, 19.7% were
math/physical science majors, and 9.8% were non-technical
majors. As a consequence the population of interest is re-
duced in the first instance to male graduates between the ages
of 19 and 29 years who are U.S. citizens. To refine the
analysis even further, a target population consisting of
engineering and math/physical science majors is defined.
Unfortunately, unlike enlisted recruitment,
there have been no studies on the propensity "to enlist" of
college graduates, and the implicit assumption must be that
whatever propensity they have shown in the past will continue
into the future. Similarly, no studies are available on
the proportion expected to be medically fit, so, once again,
94

it must be assumed that past proportions will continue into
the future. It must also be assumed that the same proportion
of graduates will continue to meet the grade-point-average
requirements. Finally, although the group of interest is
from 19 to 29 years of age, data, such as that published by
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and simi-
lar sources, are broken into an 18-24 age group.
Taken all at once, these assumptions appear
to be overwhelming, but, when considered carefully, it is
likely that each of them is quite reasonable and will not
significantly bias the analysis. Given the narrow definition
of the target population, it is likely that its characteris-
tics will be relatively stable over time. Of some concern
is the lack of data on the effect of economic factors, such
as the employment rate, on officer candidate enlistment behavior
But, as will be seen, the unemployment rate of the target
population is so low that the impact of a change is likely to
be only marginal.
C. THE SUPPLY OF COLLEGE GRADUATES
The expected supply of college graduates depends of course
on the expected number of enrollments after allowing for a
four year lag. Estimating this number is far from simple
because enrollment levels are subject to many changing forces,
and wide fluctuations in the number of enrollments must be
expected. Published projections range from a pessimistic
decline of 40 or even 50 percent through "no change" to
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increases of 25 or even 40 percent. The differences occur as
a result of different assumptions being made about participa-
tion rates, high school graduation rates, attendance by adult
and foreign students and economic projections of the private
rate of return on investment in higher education.
1. All Graduates
Nevertheless, after more than three centuries of steady
increase, there is now the prospect of declining enrollments
over the next 20 years as the size of the 18-24 age cohort
declines. This traditional college-attending cohort is pre-
dicted to decline in number by approximately 23% between 19 81
and 1997. In a report published in 19 81, the Carnegie Coun-
cil on Policy Studies in Higher Education predicted a decline
within a range of 5% (C in Table 31) to 15% (B in Table 31)
in undergraduate full-time enrollments [Ref. 16] . The factors
considered in the Carnegie model are also illustrated in
Table 31, together with their individual impacts on enroll-
ments. Column (a) shows the impact on all enrollments as
assessed by the Carnegie Council. In column (b) the effect
of factors that do not impact on 18-24 males, i.e., the target
population, have been deleted. With these effects deleted,
the decline in the college undergraduate population from which
officer candidates may be recruited lies within a range of
18% to 23%. This is considerably greater than the projected
decline for all undergraduate enrollments
.
Considering the actual number of graduates in the















Decline in 18-24 age cohort -23.3
Adjusted for the 80 percent
that this age cohort conti-
tutes of all enrollments -19
Adjusted for increase in
popiiLation 25 and over at
constant college participation
rates (+ 4 percent) -15
Adjusted for increase in % of
population 25 and over with
college e^q^erience and resultant
higher college participation
rates (+ 5 percent) -10 (A)
Mjusted for potential further
decrease in participation rates
by males 18-24 (- 5 percent) -15 (B)
Adjusted for changes in other
oanponents:
^iore blacks and irore participa-
tion by blacks (+ 2 percent)
More participation by majority
wamen 18-24 (+ 4 percent)
Increased retention (+ 4 percent)
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this thesis. However, it seems certain that the number of
enrollments is going to decline from around the fall of 19 83,
and a decline in the number of graduates beginning in the
mid-1980 's may therefore be expected.
2 . Engineering, Mathematics and Physical Science Graduates
When the analysis is restricted to male Engineering
and Math/Physical Science graduates (EMP) , the water becomes
even murkier since additional assumptions must be made. The
number of new graduates during the 1980 's will no doubt be
affected by the decline in the 18-24 age cohort, but assump-
tions must also be made about the proportion of high school
graduates who will enter EMP programs and the ratio of degrees
to freshman enrollments. Since the nuclear submarine force
does not accept female applicants, only projections on the
number of male applicants are relevant in this study. This
requires an additional assumption on the proportion of females
in each graduating class,
a. Engineering
Table 32 shows both historical and projected num-
bers of engineering bachelor degrees as forecast by the
Scientific Manpower Commission (SMC) [Ref. 17]. The projec-
tions are based on junior enrollments for 19 82 and freshman
enrollments for 1983/84 and a 70% ratio of degrees awarded
to freshmen enrollments. The projections for 19 8 5 through
19 89 are based on projections made by the NCES after adjusting
the 10% of women sex ratio used by the NCES. This ratio was
















ENGINEERING BACHELOR DEGREES , BY SEX
1969-81 AND PROJECTED TO 1998





















































Based on present enrollments at Junior Year (1982)
and Freshman Year (198 3 and 1984)
.
Based on NCES intermediate projections of total
degrees at 13.3% for men, 2.4% for women.
Based on number of high school graduates 4 years
earlier — 4.5% for men, 0.75% for women.
High school graduates estimated at 71% of males and
76% of females in averaged 17-18 year old population,
Source: National Center for Education Statistics




compared with actual 1979/80 data. The estimates for 1990
through 199 8 are based on the estimated number of high school
graduates four years earlier and a value of 4.5% of male and
.75% of female graduates entering the engineering curriculum.
The projections indicate a continuing rise in the
number of degrees awarded to a peak in 19 85, followed by a
steady decline through 1998. The number of degrees awarded
to males rose by approximately 25% from 1970 to 1980 and is
projected to rise a further 18% by 1985. However, by 1990
the total is expected to decline to around 58,000, an increase
of only 9% over the 19 80 total. By 199 8, the total is expected
to decline even further to slightly less than the 1980 total.
Although not so pessimistic as might have been
expected after the analysis of the previous section, the above
projections are based on two critical assumptions. If these
assumptions do not hold, then the actual number of degrees
awarded may be expected to fall considerably. Firstly, it
is assumed that the level of unemployment among engineering
graduates, presently less than 1.5%, will remain low, and
beginning salaries will remain high relative to salaries
offered to baccalaureate graduates in other fields. Secondly,
the projections assume that schools of engineering will not
be forced to cut back on enrollments because of a shortage
of faculty, a shortage that is already being felt in some
schools. In the fall of 1981, the faculty shortage, which
has been caused by the high demand for baccalaureate-level
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graduates, was approximately 2500 [Ref . 17] . If the demand
for engineering graduates remains high, fewer graduates will
go on to post-graduate work, thus making it difficult to
eliminate the faculty shortage. The proportion of engineering
graduates entering full-time graduate study has dropped from
20% in 1975 to 12% in 1979 and 1980 [Ref. 17].
b. Mathematics and Statistics
The number of mathematics and statistics degrees
has fallen from 27,442 in 1970 to 11,473 in 1980 (Table 33)
.
Complete data are not yet available but this figure is expected
to show a further decline to about 8100 for 19 81 and remain
fairly steady at that figure through the rest of the decade.
The number of degrees awarded to males is expected to fall by
about 11% during the period 19 81 through 19 89. However,
this fall should be viewed in the context of the rapid decline
in degrees during the 1970 's. In view of the margin of error
implicit in forecasting, the supply of mathematics and statis-
tics graduates can, for practical purposes, be viewed as
remaining steady during the 1980 's.
c. Other Physical Sciences
A similar analysis may be applied to the physical
sciences, i.e., physics and chemistry, where the number of
baccalaureate degrees awarded has remained relatively constant
through the 1970 's (Table 34). After a peak in 1969, the
number of physics degrees awarded declined steadily, albeit





1970 -1980 AND PROJECTED TO 1989
YEAR TOTAL MEN WOMEN
1970 27,442 17,179 10,263
1971 24,801 15,376 9,425
1972 23,713 14,464 9,249
1973 23,067 13,794 9,273
1974 21,635 12,786 8,849
1975 18,181 10,581 7,600
1976 15,984 9,478 6,506
1977 14,196 8,304 5,892
1978 12,569 7,365 5,204
1979 12,115 7,075 5,040

















































Source: National Center for Education Statistics,
American Institute of Physic's
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appears to be ending as job opportunities get closer in
balance with the number of new graduates [Ref . 17] . Simi-
larly, since 1970, the number of chemistry degrees awarded
has remained fairly stable around 11,000 per annum, except
for a drop in 19 72 and 19 73. No data are available on the
sex ratio of graduates, but in 19 80 women made up 13% of
physics and 25% of chemistry bachelor graduates.
D. THE DEMAND FOR COLLEGE GRADUATES
The demand for college graduates either collectively or
by particular disciplines is difficult to assess since demand
can be defined in many ways. At what level of unemployment
may demand and supply be considered to be in balance? How
is the level of unemployment measured? Is a graduate working
outside his or her field unemployed? These questions and
other data problems make an accurate assessment of the future
demand for graduates very difficult indeed, particularly if
the time horizon examined is greater than just a year or two.
However, demand is the other side of the supply coin and must
be addressed to give meaning to predicted changes in supply.
On its own a projected change in the supply of graduates
tells little about the future recruiting environment. To
make some prognosis about that requires some feel for the
demand side of the equation.
1. All Graduates
Historically, the demand for college graduates has
risen along with the increase in supply. The Carnegie
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Commission attributes this primarily to the increasing pro-
portion of the labor force engaged in professional and mana-
gerial occupations and predicts that after an uncharacteristic
slump in the 1970 's, a period during which the Navy still
failed to recruit sufficient numbers of nuclear propulsion
officer candidates, this long run upward trend will continue.
The Commission feels that the combination of a declining
supply and a continuing firm demand will produce improving
job prospects for graduates during the 19 80 's unless the rate
of economic growth falls to abnormally low levels, say less
than 2% per annum.
This prognosis is supported by two long-term ongoing
surveys that measure the demand for new graduates, the College
Placement Council (CPC) , which reports three times per year,
and an annual report by Frank S . Endicott of Northwestern
University. For 19 82 the CPC survey predicts a 15% increase
in job opportunities for new graduates while Endicott predicts
an 11% increase [Ref. 18: p. 73].
The SMC does not appear to be so optimistic, however,
and expects that about 3 million of the approximately 13.5
million graduates entering the labor force between 19 78 and
1990 will have to seek employment in a non-traditional occu-
pation, or face unemployment. Unfortunately, this does not
directly translate into a greater supply of potential officer
candidates. In the past, unemployed graduates have been able
to find employment by accepting positions in occupations not
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normally filled by graduates, such as clerical and blue collar
occupations and in service industries. The question is whether
a graduate prefers to accept civilian employment outside his
field over joining the Navy, where he may be able to utilize
his training more directly, i.e., how anxious he is to use his
newly acquired skills.
2 . Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical Science
Graduates
Although there is some disagreement on the projected
demand for all graduates, there is general agreement that
graduates in the technical disciplines are in a much better
position. Table 35 shows the percentage increase in new hires
from 19 78 to 19 79 by employers recruiting from College Place-
ment Offices for graduates with particular types of training.
As can be seen, the increase was greatest in the technical
disciplines, the traditional source of nuclear propulsion
officer candidates, indicating strong civilian competition
for this type of graduate.
Furthermore, this competition is expected to continue.
A U.S. News and World Report survey predicts that for 19 82
demand will increase by 21%, and starting salaries, already
higher than the military offers [Ref. 19: p. 29], will be
"up some" on 1981 [Ref. 18: p. 73]. Starting-salary data
show that engineers continue to top all bachelor degree
graduates in terms of beginning salary levels. The October




PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN HIRES BY CURRICULAR
GROUPINGS AND DEGREE LEVELS, BY RECRUITING
THROUGH COLLEGE PLACEMENT OFFICES,
JUNE 1978 TO JUNE 1979
Bachelor's lister's Doctoral All
Curricular Groupings Level Level Level Levels
Engineering (including engi-
neering technologies) 22% 24^ 31^ 22%
Sciences, math, and technical
(including coiputer science,
etc.) 20 17 20 19
Business (including account-
ing, marketing, business
raanaganent, etc.) 11 16 (a) 12
Nontechnical (including lib-
eral arts, social science,
hone econcmics, etc.) 4 17
Total, excluding federal
government 14 18 22 15
Total, including federal
government 18 22 10
(a) Number of cases very small
SOURCE: Carnegie Commission, 19 81
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engineering hires and 23% in the science, mathematics, and
2
other technical disciplines at the bachelor's level. Another
study, by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in August 19 81,
predicts a higher-than-average rate of growth of total employ-
ment in the technical areas [Ref . 17]
.
In 19 80, less than 1% of nuclear or ocean engineering
graduates were seeking work and had no offers. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics reported an overall unemployment rate for
engineers of only 1.3% for 1980 and 1.5%, 1.4% and 1.3%
respectively, for the first 3 quarters of 1981 [Ref. 17].
Not many of the 3 million graduates accepting work outside
their field will be engineers, and even fewer may wish to join
the nuclear Navy to be able to work in their area of speciali-
zation. No doubt, many will view civilian employment even
outside their field, as more desirable than Naval service.
An indication of the increasing level of civilian competition
can be seen in the experience of the United States Air Force.
In 19 68, the Air Force recruited over 5% of the college engineer-
ing graduates. Currently they are able to recruit only about
1.5%, which is well short of their goal [Ref. 19: p. 29].
E. CONCLUSION
Although the decline in the size of the 18-24 age cohort
is known with some certainty, it is by no means certain that
Includes engineering technologies.
2 Includes computer science, geology, etc,
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they will have the same college participation rates as
previous generations, or that their academic performances
will be the same. Data on graduate school applicants supplied
to the Carnegie Council by the Educational Testing Service
indicate that the academic performances of graduates as
measured by scores on tests taken before entering graduate
work has deteriorated significantly [Ref . 16] .
This deterioration could indicate that not only is the
size of the graduate pool declining but also there could
well be a decline in the proportion of that pool who reach
the academic standards required for entry into the nuclear
submarine force.
There are some contradictions in the demand vs supply
projections for all graduates, but the situation with engineer-
ing graduates is even less clear. The supply of new gradu-
ates has been increasing since 19 75 and is expected to con-
tinue to do so at least until 19 85, but the level of demand
is also rising, albeit less predictably. If demand continues
to rise past 19 85, then severe shortages are certain unless
something is done to arrest the predicted drop in supply
after that year. The effect of proposed increases in defense
expenditures on the demand for engineers in the civilian
labor market is still not clear, and there is some disagree-
ment as to whether the supply will exceed demand or whether
shortages will exist in the later part of the 1980 's. Because
of the nature of most defense contracts, changes in government
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policy in this area have a significant impact on the demand
for engineers and other technically trained personnel.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the market for tech-
nically qualified graduates in general and engineers in par-
ticular is going to remain very tight during the 19 80 's.
During Congressional testimony on July 21, 19 81, the Under-
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Richard
D. De Lauer, reported a projected shortage of industrial
engineers of 49% over the next 10 years [Ref. 20: p. 27],
In a separate study, the Bureau of Labor Statistics put a
figure on this projection when they projected a net nationwide
shortfall of 16,000 engineers each year for the period 1980-
1990 [Ref. 19: p. 26]. Today, engineers and other technically
qualified graduates have considerably less trouble finding
employment in this field than do graduates in non-technical
disciplines, and the weight of evidence suggests that this
situation will continue through the decade of the 19 80 's.
Great uncertainties also exist about the impact of many
other factors, such as changing economic conditions or govern-
ment policies, that can have a profound impact on enrollment
levels. Any rigorous study of future officer supply should
explicitly take these factors into consideration. To some
extent the military, by expanding simultaneously in almost
every area, is competing against itself. Increased efforts
to recruit more Category I and II high school graduates into
the enlisted ranks, if successful, may well reduce the pool
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of college graduates with a positive propensity towards
military service. In addition, all of the Services are try-
ing to attract a greater number of technically trained
officer candidates, and, since there is only one common
supply pool, they are in direct competition with each other.
When it is recalled that the nuclear submarine force has
consistently failed to meet its officer accession goals during
a period (1960-1980) when the number of both EMP and non-
technical graduates was increasing, there can be little
doubt that, in the face of an increased requirement for
accessions, a declining supply pool and increased competition,
recruiting sufficient numbers of quality officer candidates
will be a major challenge during the 1980 's.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Forecasting is, at best, a risky business. There are
too many unknown and unknowable factors at work for any
manpower planner to project into the future with certainty.
The problems are magnified when the accuracy of the histori-
cal data on which the projections are based can also be called
into question. How can one be sure what attrition rates will
be in the future if one does not even know with certainty what
they have been in the recent past? Even if one does know pre-
cisely, this is no guarantee that historical rates will con-
tinue into the future. Nevertheless, the analysis of this
thesis leaves room for some optimism. Shortages are projected
but they are not overwhelming. Realistic policies are suggested
that eliminate all projected shortages within a reasonable
time frame. As was emphasized on several occasions, no attempt
was made to project "the" future manpower position of the
nuclear submarine force or to present "the" solution. Rather,
the intention was to place some parameters around the problem
of manning the nuclear submarine force of the 19 80 's and be-
yond; hence, the use of four levels of demand, and low,
medium and high attrition vectors. At each step a range of
alternatives was presented and the reader left free to follow




Chapter I provides a brief introduction to the nature of
the officer manpower problem faced by the nuclear submarine
force and the purpose, methodology and necessary assumptions
of the study. In Chapter II, four levels of demand are pre-
sented. Each level was based on different assumptions on
which positions must be filled by nuclear qualified officers,
and on different sea/shore rotation ratios. In Chapter III,
six possible supply projections are presented on the basis
of three different attrition vectors and two promotion rates.
Each possible supply scenario was compared with each demand
scenario in Chapter IV. Projections out to 1990 only are
examined in an effort to identify the immediate manpower
problems of the submarine force. An important finding of
this chapter was that, although significant shortages are
projected for CDR's and LCDR's under all but the most opti-
mistic projections, no shortages are projected for LT ' s and
LTJG's regardless of the level of demand or attrition vector.
In the short term, i.e., 1982-1990, increasing the number of
accessions will not affect the shortage of senior officers and
increased accessions into the junior ranks are not required.
In Chapter V, the problem of manning the submarine force
in the long term was addressed. To simplify the analysis only
demand level B (high manning/high ratio) and supply projection
II (medium attrition) were considered. All projected shortages
can be eliminated by 1995 simply by increasing the accession
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rate. Even if the accession rate is not increased above its
present level of approximately 400 per annum, the only-
shortage that persists in steady state is some 112 LCDR's.
However, even at the highest projected accession rate, short
term shortages occur during the 1980 's and early 1990 's in
the rank of LCDR and for CDR during the period 1986 to 1991.
If a lateral entry program is introduced, the shortage of
LCDR's can be eliminated. If the accession rate remains at
its current level such a lateral entry program will need to
be ongoing, but if the accession rate can be increased even
to the medium rate, then lateral entry will be required only
until about 19 87. No lateral entry program short of entry
at CDR level, or very senior LCDR, can reduce the projected
shortage of CDR's in the period 1986 to 1988.
Finally, in Chapter VI, the projected supply of college
graduates, particularly engineering, mathematics and physical
science majors was examined in an attempt to assess the future
recruiting environment for potential officer candidates quali-
fied to enter the nuclear submarine force. Although the data
are subject to interpretation, it seems clear that the market
for the type of graduate sought by the nuclear submarine force
is going to remain tight during the 1980 's. Increasing the
number of accessions is a viable long term solution to the
officer manpower shortages projected, but to increase acces-
sions, even by 100 per annum, will not be an easy task. If
a policy of increased accessions is implemented, it will have
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to be accompanied by an aggressive recruiting program that
can compete effectively against some fierce competition in
the civilian labor market.
B. CONCLUSION
This study has identified three decision areas in which





The optimistic projections under the low attrition vector
demonstrate vividly the benefit to be gained by reducing
attrition rates. But this point is generally well appreciated
and does not need belaboring. The decision here is not whether
to reduce attrition rates but how, and by how much?
The remaining decision areas should, however, be evalu-
ated in the context of the particular pattern of shortages
projected. Because shortages are projected at the CDR and
LCDR level, but not in the junior officer ranks (LT and LTJG)
,
increasing the number of accessions is not the answer to the
officer shortages faced by the nuclear submarine force during
the 1980 's. In the long term, past 1993, a policy of in-
creased accessions can eliminate all of the projected
shortages. In fact, in the long term, increasing the number





Determining the most cost effective mix of policies de-
signed to reduce attrition and policies designed to increase
the number of accessions is already the subject of study by
the Center for Naval Analysis, at least at the enlisted level.
However, short of a significant reduction in attrition rates
among CDR's and LCDR's, the nuclear submarine force has no
alternative but to accept a policy of lateral entry if it is
desired to fully man the force with nuclear qualified offi-
cers during the 1980 's and early 1990 's. When considering
such a policy the term "lateral entry" is not defined simply
as reduced attrition, but any entry into the nuclear submarine
force, from whatever source, at any level other than Ensign.
In this case, entry at LCDR level is proposed and multiple
sources of supply should be considered. Once the initial
shortfall has been overcome the annual requirement for lateral
entrants is not large. Recruiting efforts could be very
specific, even down to approaching individuals e.g., prior
service officers or civilians employed in the nuclear power
industry. The continuing controversy over the development
of nuclear power plants has reduced employment in the civilian
nuclear power field and an aggressive lateral entry recruit-
ing campaign directed at experienced nuclear power engineers
may well be quite successful.
Manpower planners in the nuclear submarine force have
three policy options to consider: reducing attrition, in-
creasing accessions, and introduction of a lateral entry
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program. The most cost effective mix of these three policies
is a subject for further research, but the final mix will
be determined largely by the unique pattern of shortages and





NUCLEAR QUALIFIED SUBMARINE OFFICERS
PROMOTION RATE ATTRITION RATE
COLUMN YCS RANK "PLAN" "REVISED" "HIGH" "MED" "LOW"
1 3 LTJG — — .0385 .0821 .001
2 4 * * .1344 .1536 .060
3 5 LT — — .3286 .3473 .247
4 6 _-. — .1930 .2500 .165
5 7 — -_ .2714 .1707 .130
6 8 .0388 .1 .0862 .0740 .069
.8276 .95
.5417 .75
7 9 .0964 .0486 .068
8 10 .4583 .0803 .047
9 11 — — 1.0 1.0 1.0
10 9 LCDR — — .0486 .068
11 10 ~ — .0610 .0803 .047
12 11 ~ — .1034 .060 .044
13 12 — ~ .1636 .060 .032
14 13 -- — .1325 .060 .022
15 14 .0246 .0246 .1154 .060 .011
16 15 .7792 .7792 .1620 .050 .003
17 16 .2222 .2222 .6349 .050 .003
18 17 — — .050 .003
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100% of LTJG who do not attrite are promoted. The
promotion rate therefore varies with the rate of
attrition and is equal to 1 minus the rate of attrition
^ Promotion to captain is included in the rate of
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